Topics of Seminar 8



European Company (Part 2)

- Internal governance rules of the SE
- Board structures
 - one tier and two-tier systems
- Employee participation and corporate law
 - Theoretical foundations
 - Employee participation in the SE procedures
 - Legal arbitrage and employee participation

Internal governance of the SE



Structure of the SE

- ■"Company Organs"
 - General meeting
 - Unitary board ("administrative organ") one-tier structure
 - Management board and supervisory board two-tier structure
- Choice to be made in Statutes (AoA)
 - i.e. ultimately by the shareholders
- General meeting
 - Appoint (supervisory) board members
 - Exact competence of GM defined by national (plc) law and EU company law (where harmoised)
 - E.g. issuing shares


SE boards



- Terms of board members not to exceed 6 years
 - Re-election possible
- Disqualification (Art 47)
- Certain transactions subject to express board approval
 - Subject to statutes and applicable national law
- Liability of board members:

"Members of an SE's [board] shall be liable, in accordance with the provisions applicable to [PLCs] in the Member State in which the SE's registered office is situated ... following any breach [of their] duties."

- Art 51



Two-tier structure




- Management board
 - responsible for day-to-day management
 - Informs supervisory board
- Supervisory board
 - supervises work of the management organ
 - must not exercise the power to manage the SE
- Board size subject to statutes and Member State regulation
- Appointment

Internal governance of the SE



Two-tier structure



One-tier structure



- Unitary board (administrative organ)
 - responsible for day-to-day management
 - Usually: executive and non-executive members
 - Advise / supervise
- Board size subject to statutes and Member State regulation
- Appointment by general meeting

Employee involvement




- Employee information and consultation
 - Providing employees (representative bodies) with information about corporate decisions
 - Establishing a dialogue between employees and management
- Employee participation
 - Influence on composition of administrative/supervisory body
 - Election / nomination / recommendation / opposition rights

Employee participation and corporate law



- What is the theoretical justification for a system of "shareholder primacy"?
- Are employees "adjusting stakeholders"?
- Protection by contract?
- Is employee participation detrimental to shareholder wealth?
- In what way can employee participation influence employee behaviour?
- What is a firm-specific investment?



The political dimension



- Potential distributional effects of employee participation
 - May strengthens the bargaining power of employees
 - Potential positive externalities?
 - Strikes, "social peace", etc
 - egalitarian society?
- Short-termism and long-term investments
 - Potential influence of shareholder primacy on investment strategies
 - Compare US / UK /Germany

Board-level employee participation in the EU

Employee Participation, GDP per capita and equality (EU-27)



Board-level employee participation in the EU


Employee participation, GDP per capita and equality (EU-15)



Board-level employee participation in the EU

Employee Participation, GDP per capita and equality (EU-15)

(with The Netherlands and France not assigned to either group, ex Luxembourg)





- The "before and after" principle
 - BL Employee participation only mandatory where preexisting → "defensive" approach
- Special Negotiating Body (SNB)
 - Representatives from each Member State concerned
 - One employee representative from a Member State for each 10% (or less) of total employees
 - Subject to overall cap, companies ceasing to exist (merger) shall be assigned a representative
 - Decisions usually with "double" ordinary majority



- Election/appointment according to MS law
- Function of the SNB
 - SNB negotiates with management about employee participation
 - Mutual agreement necessary
 - But: Strong default rules
 - Standard Rules → highest proportion
 - Negotiation timeframe: 6 months
 - (12 months with mutual agreement)



- The "Standard Rules"
 - "highest proportion"-principle
 - Numeric determination!
 - Participation by employees from different MS to be decided by SNB
- Scope of application
 - Agreement
 - No agreement within timeframe (default)
 - and 25% (merger) / 50% (holding/sub) or decision by SNB
 - "No escape" in transformation



- When can employees agree to go <u>below</u> "highest standard"?
 - Never if established by way of transformation

In other cases:

- Supermajority (2/3) if participation applied to 25% (merger) / 50% (holding/subsidiary)
- Always supermajority if decided to opt-out completely
- "No export no escape"