# Global Income Inequality, 1820-2020 The Persistence and Mutation of Extreme inequality

Thomas Piketty
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#### New estimates on global income inequality 1820-2020: main results

- Persistence of a highly hierarchical world economic system
  - Global top 10% share oscillated around 50-60% of total income over 1820-2020, bottom 50% share around 5-10% (same order of magnitude as top 0.1% share)
  - Global inequality close to South Africa inequality level: pretty extreme
- Global inequality increase between 1820 and 1910
  - During this period between and within inequality were rising

- Gobal inequality stabilized at a high level betwen 1910 and 2020
  - During this period between and within inequality followed diverging trajectories
  - Different policies could lead to other trajectories



#### Relation to existing literature: building on new wave of historical inequality research

- Continuation of new wave of historical research on long-run inequality trends
  - Kuznets (1953), Atkinson and Harrison (1978), Piketty (2001), Piketty and Saez (2003), Piketty and Atkinson (2007, 2010), World Inequality Report 2018
  - New inequality series for India (Chancel and Piketty, 2019), China (Piketty, Yang, Zucman, 2019), Russia (Piketty, Novokmet, Zucman, 2019), Latin America (Morgan, 2018; Flores, 2018), etc. constructed therefater (see WID.world)
  - See also DINA Guidelines (Distributional National Accounts) 2020 on WID.world: systematic combination of survey data, tax data and national accounts
  - Novelty of the present research: we go back through time and attempt to expand longitudinal global coverage of World Inequality Database (WID.world)



#### Relation to existing literature: building on Maddison and Bourguignon-Morrisson

- We build on earlier attempts at constructing global (distributional) accounts
  - Maddison (2001) and Maddison project (2020) provide long-run national accounts estimates (aggregate national income and population)
  - Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) produce global distributional estimates 1820-1992
    - We find similar results for 19c (rising inequality trend) and 20c (mixture of stabilization & contradictory movements)
    - We use the new wave of historical research on inequality series, leading to more precise estimates.
       Our results generally lead to higher inequality levels and more amplitude in inequality shifts.
    - We extend the analysis over the 1820-2020 period to quantify mixture of within/between dynamics driving recent global inequality trends. Looking at 1990-2020 is key in order to put the recent period of between-country convergence into a broader historical perspective.



#### Methodology and Data sources

Table 1. A new database on global income inequality: regions, countries, years

Regions	Countries	Years
East Asia	China, Japan Other East Asia	
Europe	Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain Sweden, Other Western Europe Other Eastern Europe	
Latin America	Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Colombia Mexico, Other Latin America	1820, 1850,
Middle East/North Africa	Algeria, Egypt, Turkey Other Middle East/North Africa	1880, 1900, 1910, 1920,
North America	USA Canada	1930, 1940, 1950, 1960,
Oceania	Australia, New Zealand Other Oceania	1970, 1980-2020
Russia/Central Asia	Russia Other Russia/Central Asia	
South/South-East Asia	n/South-East Asia Other South/Sout-East Asia	
Sub Saharan Africa	South Africa Other Sub-Saharan Africa	

Interpretation. The global income inequality database covers 9 world regions and 33 individual countries and sub-regions over the 1820-2020 period. Sources and series: Chancel and Piketty (2021). See wid.world/longrun



#### Methodology and data sources: population

Table 2. Global population by region, 1820-2020 (% global population)

	1820	1900	1950	1980	2020
Global population (millions)	1 044	1 559	2 521	4 433	7 665
World	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
East Asia	42%	31%	<b>27</b> %	27%	21%
inc. China	37%	26%	22%	22%	18%
inc. Japan	3%	3%	3%	3%	2%
Europe	16%	20%	16%	11%	<b>7</b> %
inc. Great Britain	2%	3%	2%	1%	1%
inc. France	3%	3%	2%	1%	1%
inc. Germany	2%	3%	3%	2%	1%
Latin America	2%	4%	6%	8%	8%
inc. Brasil	0%	1%	2%	3%	3%
inc. Mexico	1%	1%	1%	2%	2%
Middle East & North Africa	3%	4%	4%	5%	<b>7</b> %
incl. Egypt	0%	1%	1%	1%	1%
incl. Turkey	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
North America/Oceania	1%	5%	<b>7</b> %	6%	5%
incl. USA	1%	5%	6%	5%	4%
Russia/Central Asia	5%	8%	<b>7</b> %	6%	4%
inc. Russia	3%	5%	4%	3%	2%
South and South East Asia	24%	23%	26%	28%	33%
inc. India	20%	18%	15%	16%	18%
inc. Indonesia	1%	2%	3%	3%	4%
Sub Saharan Africa	6%	6%	<b>7</b> %	9%	14%
incl. South Africa	0%	0%	1%	1%	1%

Interpretation. The share of Europe in world population dropped from 16% in 1820 to 7% in 2020, while that of Sub-Saharan Africa rose from 6% to 14%. Sources and series: Chancel and Piketty (2021). See wid.world/longrun



#### Methodology and data sources: per capita income

Table 3. Global per capita income by region, 1820-2020 (% global per capita income)

Table 3. Global per capita int	conic by reg	1011, 1020-20	ZO (70 globa	i per oapita	inoonic,	
	1820	1900	1950	1980	2020	
Global per capita income (2020 PPP EUR)	703	1 589	2 569	5 571	11 131	
World	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
East Asia	84%	43%	29%	45%	123%	
inc. China	82%	40%	20%	20%	109%	
inc. Japan	100%	71%	85%	237%	226%	
Europe	192%	210%	201%	257%	239%	
inc. Great Britain	233%	315%	294%	212%	240%	
inc. France	225%	254%	254%	339%	264%	
inc. Germany	175%	234%	188%	315%	295%	
Latin America	113%	85%	113%	125%	90%	
inc. Brasil	129%	58%	91%	136%	89%	
inc. Mexico	129%	103%	123%	151%	106%	
Middle East & North Africa	173%	144%	117%	173%	121%	
incl. Egypt	151%	110%	63%	57%	80%	
incl. Turkey	178%	113%	104%	106%	151%	
North America/Oceania	255%	341%	404%	351%	346%	
incl. USA	263%	350%	411%	354%	354%	
Russia/Central Asia	71%	98%	144%	166%	110%	
inc. Russia	74%	102%	150%	212%	149%	
South and South East Asia	62%	29%	25%	22%	47%	
inc. India	57%	25%	22%	16%	41%	
inc. Indonesia	57%	26%	16%	20%	68%	
Sub Saharan Africa	62%	<b>57%</b>	56%	39%	23%	
incl. South Africa	92%	100%	159%	134%	75%	
Intermediation Assertation Assertation and continuous in Fact Asia decreased from \$240/ of world every section 1920 to						

Interpretation. Average per capita income in East Asia dropped from 84% of world average in 1820 to 29% in 1950, before rising to 123% in 2020. Sources and series: Chancel and Piketty (2021). See wid.world/longrun




#### Methodology and data sources: aggregate income

Table 4. Global income by region, 1820-2020 (% global income)

	1820	1900	1950	1980	2020
Global income (billions 2020 PPP EUR)	734	2 477	6 477	24 696	85 318
World	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
East Asia	36%	13%	8%	12%	26%
inc. China	30%	10%	4%	4%	20%
inc. Japan	3%	2%	3%	6%	4%
Europe	32%	41%	32%	29%	17%
inc. Great Britain	5%	8%	6%	3%	2%
inc. France	7%	6%	4%	4%	2%
inc. Germany	4%	8%	5%	6%	3%
Latin America	2%	3%	<b>7</b> %	10%	8%
inc. Brasil	1%	1%	2%	4%	2%
inc. Mexico	1%	1%	1%	2%	2%
Middle East & North Africa	6%	6%	5%	9%	8%
incl. Egypt	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
incl. Turkey	2%	1%	1%	1%	2%
North America/Oceania	3%	18%	27%	20%	17%
incl. USA	3%	17%	25%	18%	15%
Russia/Central Asia	4%	7%	10%	9%	4%
inc. Russia	2%	5%	6%	7%	3%
South and South East Asia	15%	7%	7%	6%	15%
inc. India	11%	5%	3%	2%	7%
inc. Indonesia	1%	1%	0%	1%	2%
Sub Saharan Africa	4%	3%	4%	<b>3</b> %	3%
incl. South Africa	0%	0%	1%	1%	1%

Interpretation. The share of North America/Oceania in world income rose from 3% in 1820 to 27% in 1950, and then dropped to 17% in 2020. Sources and series: see wid.world/longrun








Interpretation. The share of global income going to top 10% highest incomes at the world level has fluctuated around 50-60% between 1820 and 2020 (50% in 1820, 60% in 1910, 56% in 1980, 61% in 2000, 55% in 2020), while the share going to the bottom 50% lowest incomes has generally been around or below 10% (14% in 1820, 7% in 1910, 5% in 1980, 6% in 2000, 7% in 2020). Global inequality has always been very large. It rose between 1820 and 1910 and shows little long-run trend between 1910 and 2020. Sources and series: Chancel and Piketty (2021). See wid.world/longrun


#### The persistence of extreme inequality





Interpretation. Global inequality, as measured by the ratio T10/B50 between the average income of the top 10% and the average income of the bottom 50%, more than doubled between between 1820 and 1910, from less than 20 to about 40, and stabilized around 40 between 1910 and 2020. It is too early to say whether the decline in global inequality observed since 2008 will continue. **Sources and series**: Chancel and Piketty (2021). See wid.world/longrun


#### The persistence of extreme inequality: two peaks 1910 and 1980-2000 and fall afterwards






**Interpretation**. Global inequality, as measured by the global Gini coefficient, rose from about 0,6 in 1820 to about 0,7 in 1910, and then stabilized around 0,7 between 1910 and 2020. It is too early to say whether the decline in the global Gini coefficient observed since 2000 will continue. **Sources and series**: Chancel and Piketty (2021). See wid.world/longrun

#### Decomposing global inequality in within and between country dynamics






**Interpretation**. Between-country inequality, as measured by the ratio T10/B50 between the average incomes of the top 10% and the bottom 50% (assuming everybody within a country as the same income), rose between 1820 and 1980 and strongly declined since then. Within-country inequality, as measured also by the ratio T10/B50 between the average incomes of the top 10% and the bottom 50% (assuming all countries have the same average income), rose slightly between 1820 and 1910, declined between 1910 and 1980, and rose since 1980.

Sources and series: Chancel and Piketty (2021). See wid.world/longrun




#### Decomposing global inequality in within and between country dynamics






Interpretation. The importance of between-country inequality in overall global inequality, as measured by the Theil index, rose between 1820 and 1980 and strongly declined since then. In 2020, between-country inequality makes-up about a third of global inequality between individuals. The rest is due to inequality within countries. **Sources and series**: Chancel and Piketty (2021). See wid.world/longrun





**Interpretation**. The share of global income going to top 1% highest incomes at the world level has fluctuated around 15-25% between 1820 and 2020 (20% in 1820, 26% in 1910, 16% in 1970, 21% in 2020) and has always been substantially larger than the share going to the bottom 50%, which gas generally been of the same order of magnitude as the share going to the top 0,1%. **Sources and series**: Chancel and Piketty (2021). See wid.world/longrun

#### Top end inequality:T1/B50 income ratio





Interpretation. Global inequality, as measured by the ratio T1/B50 between the average income of the top 1% and the average income of the bottom 50%, more than doubled between between 1820 and 1910, from about 70 to about 180, and stabilized around 150 between 1910 and 2020. It is too early to say whether the decline in global inequality observed since 2008 will continue. **Sources and series**: Chancel and Piketty (2021). See wid.world/longrun

#### Top end inequality: the ultra rich never fully recovered their Belle Epoque wealth




Figure 8. Global income inequality, 1820-2020: T0,1/B50 ratio








Figure 9. Global income inequality, 1820-2020: T1/M40 vs M40/B50 average income ratios



Interpretation. Bottom-end global inequality, as measured by the ratio M40/B50 between the average incomes of the middle 40% and the bottom 50%, rose from 3,3 in 1820 to 9,1 in 1980, down to 6,7 in 2020. Top-end global inequality, as measured by the ratio T1/M40 between the average incomes of the top 1% and the middle 40%, rose from 22 in 1820 to 32 in 1910, down to 15 in 1970, up to 22 in 2020. Sources and series: Chancel and Piketty (2021). See wid.world/longrun




#### Post-1980 period: elephant curve of inequality and growth



Interpretation. The bottom 50% incomes of the world saw substantial growth between 1980 and 2020 (between +50% and +200%). The top 1% incomes also benefited from high growth (between +100% and +200%). Intermediate categories grew less. In sum, inequality decreased between the bottom and the middle of the global income distribution, and increased between the middle and the top. In effect, the top 1% captured 22% of total world growth between 1980 and 2020, vs 11% for the bottom 50%. **Sources and series**: Chancel and Piketty (2021). See wid.world/longrun




#### 1820-2020: much bigger income growth for the top 30% than for bottom 50%



Interpretation. The bottom 50% incomes of the world saw substantial growth between 1820 and 2020 (between +600% and +1000%). The top 30% incomes benefited from even higher growth (between +1600% and +1800%). Sources and series: Chancel and Piketty (2021) See wid.world/longrun



#### Regional decomposition





Interpretation. The regional composition of the global top 10% has changed enormously between 1820 and 2020. In particular, the share of East Asia and South/South-East Asia within the global top 10% collapsed between 1820 and 1950, before gradually rising between 1950 and 2020.

Note: Oceania is included in North America (see Tables 2-4). Sources and series: Chancel and Piketty (2021). See wid.world/longrun





Figure 13. The Regional Composition of the Global Top 1%, 1820-2020




Interpretation. The regional composition of the global top 1% has changed enormously between 1820 and 2020. In particular, the share of East Asia and South/South-East Asia within the global top 10% collapsed between 1820 and 1950, before gradually rising between 1950 and 2020.


Note: Oceania is included in North America (see Tables 2-4). Sources and series: Chancel and Piketty (2021). See wid.world/longrun

#### Regional decomposition











Interpretation. The regional composition of the global middle 40% has changed singificantly between 1820 and 2020. In particular, the share of East Asia and South/South-East Asia within the global middle 40% increased substantially between 1940 and 2020.

Note: Oceania is included in North America (see Tables 2-4). Sources and series: Chancel and Piketty (2021). See wid.world/longrun

#### Robustness checks


 Different variants regarding the evolution of within-countries inequality between 1820 and 1910


In practice, this has relatively little impact on the overall pattern

 As demonstrated by Figure 4, the really striking trend over the 1820-1910 period is the rise of between-countries inequality




#### Decomposing global inequality in within and between country dynamics





**Interpretation**. Between-country inequality, as measured by the ratio T10/B50 between the average incomes of the top 10% and the bottom 50% (assuming everybody within a country as the same income), rose between 1820 and 1980 and strongly declined since then. Within-country inequality, as measured also by the ratio T10/B50 between the average incomes of the top 10% and the bottom 50% (assuming all countries have the same average income), rose slightly between 1820 and 1910, declined between 1910 and 1980, and rose since 1980.





#### Discussion: development and persistence of center-periphery relations

 Large and persistent inequality in income is due to large inequality in productivity (hourly income) and capital endowment (human & physical)

 Why doesn't capital flow to poor countries? In principle, this would raise global output and reduce global inequality tremendously

In reality, unless forced to do so, wealthiest groups are unlikely to give up their wealth for free. They prefer to remain in control and to lend their resources at highest possible price to poorer groups.



#### Discussion: development and persistence of center-periphery relations

- Two consequences:
  - First, the fact that the poorest groups are borrowers implies that they have less economic autonomy and lower incentives to produce.
  - Next, because lenders fear expropriation they tend to regulate their relation with the poorest groups through colonial and military domination and to organize investment patterns so as to keep control of the most valuable production processes.

See Pomeranz « Great Divergence » (2000), Parthasarathi (2011), Beckert (2014): central role of military and colonial domination in accounting for the rise of global inequality 1820-1950.



#### Discussion: development and persistence of center-periphery relations

We see a beginning of convergence since 1980, but this is very slow (between-country inequality today is close to 1900 level, and much higher than in 1820), and there is a risk that new economic powers like China also created center-periphery relations with poorer countries

- In order to accelerate the process, one would need larger investment in human and physical investment in the global South together with greater reliance on self-governement
- E.g. a fraction of global tax revenues coming from multinationals or billionaires could be shared between all countries in proportion to population
- Even if it is a small fraction, it would make an enormous difference for public investment in education, health and infrastructure in the South



#### Summary and conclusion

 A new dataset to study global income inequality in the long run, based on the new wave of historical research on inequality trends

 We obtain suggestive results (persistence of extreme inequality) but more work required to understand drivers of global inequality over 1820-2020

Dynamics of (foreign) wealth ownership

Evolution of material inequality (carbon/energy consumption)



## Supplementary slides



#### Methodology and data sources: country-level inequality trends (top 10% share)

Table 5. Inequality by region, 1820-2020 (Top 10% income share)

	1820	1900	1950	1980	2020
World	50%	60%	55%	56%	55%
East Asia	46%	51%	37%	59%	44%
inc. China	46%	51%	27%	28%	42%
inc. Japan	45%	47%	28%	35%	43%
Europe	50%	54%	39%	30%	36%
inc. Great Britain	50%	56%	49%	30%	36%
inc. France	49%	50%	34%	28%	32%
inc. Germany	47%	53%	30%	29%	38%
Latin America	53%	<b>57%</b>	58%	55%	55%
inc. Brasil	53%	55%	58%	55%	57%
inc. Mexico	54%	55%	58%	53%	59%
Middle East & North Africa	53%	56%	53%	67%	<b>57%</b>
incl. Egypt	53%	58%	61%	51%	49%
incl. Turkey	53%	54%	55%	55%	51%
North America	42%	40%	39%	34%	45%
incl. USA	42%	40%	39%	34%	45%
Russia/Central Asia	45%	48%	27%	26%	46%
inc. Russia	45%	48%	27%	26%	46%
South and South East Asia	47%	<b>52%</b>	39%	46%	54%
inc. India	48%	54%	35%	32%	57%
inc. Indonesia	41%	42%	46%	40%	41%
Sub Saharan Africa	49%	54%	55%	58%	56%
incl. South Africa	49%	53%	53%	47%	65%

Interpretation. In East Asia in 1980, the top 10% income share was equal to 59% of total income. **Sources and series**: Chancel and Piketty (2021). See wid.world/longrun



#### Methodology and data sources: country-level inequality trends (bottom 50% share)

Table 6. Inequality by region, 1820-2020 (Bottom 50% income share)

	1820	1900	1950	1980	2020
World	14%	7%	7%	5%	7%
East Asia	18%	17%	20%	12%	13%
inc. China	19%	17%	25%	25%	14%
inc. Japan	18%	17%	25%	21%	18%
Europe	15%	14%	20%	20%	19%
inc. Great Britain	16%	14%	16%	22%	20%
inc. France	14%	13%	19%	24%	22%
inc. Germany	17%	15%	23%	23%	19%
Latin America	11%	10%	10%	9%	10%
inc. Brasil	12%	11%	10%	11%	10%
inc. Mexico	11%	10%	10%	8%	8%
Middle East & North Africa	14%	13%	12%	7%	10%
incl. Egypt	15%	14%	13%	16%	17%
incl. Turkey	14%	13%	13%	13%	15%
North America	14%	14%	17%	19%	13%
incl. USA	14%	15%	17%	19%	13%
Russia/Central Asia	16%	15%	23%	21%	14%
inc. Russia	16%	15%	23%	27%	17%
South and South East Asia	16%	14%	17%	15%	12%
inc. India	16%	14%	20%	21%	13%
inc. Indonesia	18%	17%	16%	18%	16%
Sub Saharan Africa	13%	12%	10%	<b>7</b> %	9%
incl. South Africa	13%	12%	12%	13%	6%

Interpretation. In East Asia in 1980, the bottom 50% income share was equal to 12% of total income. Sources and series: see wid.world/longrun



### Methodology and data sources: country-level inequality trends (T10/B50 income ratio)

Table 7. Inequality by region, 1820-2020 (Top 10% avg. income divided by bot. 50% avg. income)

	1820	1900	1950	1980	2020
World	18	40	40	52	37
East Asia	12	15	9	25	16
inc. China	13	15	5	6	15
inc. Japan	12	14	4	8	12
Europe	17	19	10	7	9
inc. Great Britain	16	20	16	7	9
inc. France	18	19	9	6	7
inc. Germany	14	17	7	6	10
Latin America	23	29	29	29	28
inc. Brasil	23	25	28	25	28
inc. Mexico	25	27	30	33	34
Middle East & North Africa	19	21	21	48	27
incl. Egypt	18	21	24	16	14
incl. Turkey	19	20	21	21	16
North America / Oceania	15	14	11	9	16
incl. USA	15	14	11	9	17
Russia/Central Asia	14	16	6	6	16
inc. Russia	14	16	6	5	14
South and South East Asia	15	19	11	15	22
inc. India	15	19	9	8	22
inc. Indonesia	12	12	14	11	13
Sub Saharan Africa	19	23	26	42	32
incl. South Africa	19	23	23	18	56

Interpretation. In East Asia in 1980, top 10% average income was 25 times higher than the bottom 50% average income. Sources and series: see wid.world/longrun



#### Methodology and data sources: country-level inequality trends (top 1% share)

Table 8. Inequality by region, 1820-2020 (Top 1% income share)

	1820	1900	1950	1980	2020
World	20%	25%	19%	18%	21%
East Asia	16%	18%	<b>7</b> %	20%	16%
inc. China	16%	18%	5%	7%	14%
inc. Japan	16%	18%	9%	10%	12%
Europe	22%	26%	12%	8%	12%
inc. Great Britain	25%	31%	14%	8%	13%
inc. France	20%	22%	10%	7%	10%
inc. Germany	18%	23%	9%	10%	13%
Latin America	24%	26%	28%	23%	26%
inc. Brasil	26%	26%	30%	25%	28%
inc. Mexico	24%	25%	27%	21%	29%
Middle East & North Africa	22%	24%	22%	32%	23%
incl. Egypt	26%	28%	30%	19%	19%
incl. Turkey	21%	22%	22%	22%	18%
North America	16%	15%	16%	10%	19%
incl. USA	16%	16%	17%	10%	19%
Russia/Central Asia	16%	18%	6%	5%	20%
inc. Russia	16%	18%	6%	5%	21%
South and South East Asia	16%	17%	15%	18%	20%
inc. India	16%	17%	12%	8%	22%
inc. Indonesia	14%	14%	21%	10%	11%
Sub Saharan Africa	19%	21%	19%	20%	22%
incl. South Africa	19%	21%	17%	10%	19%

Interpretation. In East Asia in 1980, the top 1% income share was equal to 20% of total income. Sources and series: see wid.world/longrun



#### Methodology and data sources: country-level inequality trends (T1/B50 income ratio)

Table 9. Inequality by region, 1820-2020 (Top 1% avg. income divided by bot. 50% avg. income)

	1820	1900	1950	1980	2020
World	73	170	140	169	144
East Asia	44	54	19	85	60
inc. China	44	52	10	13	49
inc. Japan	45	53	17	23	33
Europe	75	93	32	20	31
inc. Great Britain	79	113	43	19	32
inc. France	75	83	27	15	23
inc. Germany	53	74	21	22	35
Latin America	110	134	145	124	136
inc. Brasil	111	119	144	112	134
inc. Mexico	113	121	141	132	169
Middle East & North Africa	78	92	93	233	114
incl. Egypt	88	105	120	61	55
incl. Turkey	76	81	85	85	60
North America / Oceania	59	54	47	28	69
incl. USA	57	53	48	27	70
Russia/Central Asia	52	61	13	12	72
inc. Russia	51	61	13	8	63
South and South East Asia	52	63	43	59	83
inc. India	50	59	29	18	83
inc. Indonesia	39	41	64	29	33
Sub Saharan Africa	75	89	92	150	127
incl. South Africa	75	88	72	38	166

Interpretation. In East Asia in 1980, top 1% average income was 85 times higher than the bottom 50% average income. Sources and series: see wid.world/longrun

